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Old Folks on the Slippery Slope: Elderly Patients
and Physician-Assisted Suicide
Marshall B. Kapp*
The current controversy in the United States over the morality
and constitutionality of state statutes that prohibit physicians
from assisting patients to commit suicide entails a variety of difficult ethical' and legal 2 issues. In policy terms, the debate has
tended to focus on whether legislatures can erect sufficiently
stringent yet workable safeguards within state statutes authorizing physician-assisted suicide to protect against serious ethical
abuses of this patient/physician prerogative. Proponents of
decriminalizing physician-assisted suicide take the affirmative
position on this question. Skeptics, on the other hand, suggest
that opening the door to physician-assisted suicide, however
cautiously and conservatively, would inevitably lead (as it
apparently has in the current Netherlands experiment with nonprosecution of physicians for participating in physician-assisted
* Professor of Community Health and Psychiatry; Director, Office of Geriatric
Medicine & Gerontology, Wright State University School of Medicine, Dayton, OH; Member of Adjunct Faculty, University of Dayton School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Task Force on Physician-Assisted Suicide of the Society for Health
and Human Values, Physician-AssistedSuicide: Toward a Comprehensive Understanding, 70 AcAD. MED. 583 (1995); Peter B. Terry, Euthanasiaand Assisted Suicide: Ethics
and Politics, 103 CHEST 4 (1993).
2. See Lee v. State of Oregon, No. 96-6467-HO (D.Or. 1996) (invalidating results
of state voter initiative legalizing physician assisted suicide); Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 850 F.Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995),
rev'd, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) en banc, reh'g denied, 85 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir. 1996) en
banc (invalidating Washington statute prohibiting physician assisted suicide on 14th
Amendment due process right to liberty grounds) cert. granted sub nom, Washington v.
Glucksburg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110); Quill v. Koppell, 870
F.Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd in partand aftd in part, sub nom., Dennis v. Vacco, 80
F.3d 716 (2nd Cir. 1996), cert. grantedsub nom, 64 U.S.L.W. 3795 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No.
95-1858) (invalidating New York statute prohibiting physician-assisted suicide on 14th
Amendment equal protection grounds): See generally T. Howard Stone & William J. Winslade, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the United States: Legal and Ethical Observations, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 481 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Charles H. Baron, et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARv J. LEGIS. 1 (1996); Paul Cotton, Rational Suicide:
No Longer 'Crazy'? 270 JAMA 797 (1993) (noting that "a shift is under way in societal
thinking on the issue, the zeitgeist is changing.... The question is will we shift wisely
and with adequate safeguards?")
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suicide) 4 to a movement in principle and practice down a moral
slippery slope toward unintended consequences 5 that almost everyone would condemn.
Most of the arguments on both sides of this discussion have
been crafted in generic terms. While a persuasive case against
recognition of a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide
generally can be mounted, as analyzed in the particular context
of elderly individuals, the anxieties of the slippery slope skeptics
appear especially compelling. These are anxieties evidently
shared by a substantial portion of the elderly population, since
public opinion polls consistently show lower support for legalization of physician-assisted suicide among older citizens than
among younger citizens. 6 The primary reasons for these wellfounded worries are briefly outlined below.
I.
A.

PARTIcuLAR RISKS FOR THE ELDERLY

Decision Making Capacity7

In health care decision making generally,' legally and ethically valid choices depend on (besides adequate information and
4. Nancy S. Jecker, Physician-Assisted Death in the Netherlands and the United
States: Ethical and CulturalAspects ofHealth Policy Development, 42 J. Am.GERIATICS
Soc'Y 672 (1994); M.T. Muller et al., Voluntary Active Euthanasiaand Physician-Assisted
Suicide in Dutch Nursing Homes: Are the Requirements for Prudent Practice Properly
Met? 42 J. Am.GERIATRIcs Soc'Y 624 (1994) (noting that physician-assisted suicide in
Dutch nursing homes, which have a primarily elderly patient population, more often than
not deviates in practice from the safeguards to which Dutch prosecutors have agreed);
CARLOS F. GOMEz, REGULATING DEATH: EUrHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS

(1991). For other international comparisons, see RONALD DwoRKIN, LIFE's DOMINION: AN
ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHNASLIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 254 n.3 (1993) (dis-

cussing laws against assisted suicide in England, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland,
Denmark, Norway and Poland).
5. Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalizationof Physician-AssistedSuicide: Creatinga Regulatory Potemkin Village, 20 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 1 (1996); Glenn C.
Graber & Jennifer Chassman, Assisted Suicide Is Not Voluntary Active Euthanasia,But
It's Awfully Close, 41 J. Am. GERIATRICS Soc'" 88 (1993); Yale Kamisar, PhysicianAssisted Suicide: The Last Bridge to Active Voluntary Euthanasia, EUTHANASIA
EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTVES 225 (John Keown, ed., 1995).
See Edmund P. Pellegrino, CompassionNeeds Reason Too, 270 JAMA 874 (1993) (stating
that "... .euthanasia and assisted suicide are socially disastrous. They are not containable
by placing legal limits on their practice. Arguments to the contrary, the 'slippery slope' is
an inescapable logical, psychological, historical and empirical reality").
6. Robert J. Blendon et al., Should PhysiciansAid Their Patients in Dying? The
Public Perspective, 267 JAMA 2658, 2659 (1992).
7. In this article, the term "decision making capacity," which is a working, clinical
concept, is used instead of "competence," which implies a formal legal declaration of the
individual's status by a court usually in the context of a guardianship proceeding. See
MARlSHALL B. KAPP, KEY WORDS IN ETHICS, LAW, & AGING: A GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY
USAGE 15-16 (1995).
8. For background on informed consent generally, see, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
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voluntariness)9 the presence of a cognitively and emotionally
capable decision maker. Although defining and evaluating a
patient's decision making capacity is an extremely complex and
uncertain endeavor,' 0 in essence an individual capable of making
decisions has the functional ability to make and express authentic choices, give reasons for those choices indicating deliberation,
comprehend and manipulate information material to those
choices, and understand the potential personal consequences of
the choices.1
As even proponents of physician-assisted suicide have
acknowledged,' 2 a capable decision maker is an especially indispensable prerequisite in a physician-assisted suicide situation,
as the costs of error are so great and irremediable. Notably,
there are at least a couple of grounds for suspecting that a suicidal individual's capacity may be particularly problematic in
cases of purported requests for physician-assisted suicide by
older persons.
First, the prevalence of dementia increases dramatically in
older patients.' 3 While the presence of dementia (a diagnostic
category) by itself, particularly in its early stages, does not neces14
sarily equate with decisional incapacity (a functional concept),
in its more severe stages, dementia ordinarily does substantially
interfere with an individual's ability to engage in a rational decision making process with respect to important and complicated
matters. Physician-assisted suicide certainly qualifies as such a
matter.
Much has been made in contemporary ethical and legal discourse of the possibilities for competent patients to guide their
RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS (1982); PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED
CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987).

9.
10.
tions on
11.

See discussion infra nn. 29-43 and accompanying text.
Marshall B. Kapp & Douglas Mossman, MeasuringDecisional Capacity: Cauthe Constructionof a 'Capacimeter"2 PSYCHOL. Pus. POL'Y, & L. 73 (1996).
See Marshall B. Kapp, Assessment of Competence to Make Medical Decisions,

PRACTICAL HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL GERONTOLOGY 174, 179-181 (Laura L. Carstensen et

al., eds., 1996); Marshall B. Kapp, EvaluatingDecisionmaking Capacity in the Elderly: A
Review of Recent Literature, 2 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 15 (Fall/Winter 1990).

12. See, e.g., Howard Brody, Assisted Death-A CompassionateResponse to a Medical Failure,327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1384, 1386 (1992); Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the
Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteriafor Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG.
J. MED 1380, 1382 (1992).
13. David S. Geldmacher & Peter J. Whitehouse, CurrentConcepts: Evaluationof
Dementia, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED 330 (1996); William E. Reichman & Jeffrey L. Cummings, Dementia, PRACTICE OF GERIATRICS 295-96 (Evan Calldns et al., eds., 2nd ed.
1992); Jeffrey L. Cummings & Lissy F. Jarvik, Dementia, in GERIATRIC MEDIINE 428
(Christine K Cassel et al., eds., 2nd ed. 1990).
14. Panagiota V. Caralis, Ethical and Legal Issues in the Care of Alzheimer's
Patients, 78 MED. CLNICS N. Am. 877, 878 (1994).
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future medical care in the event of subsequent decisional incapacity through the execution of various forms of advance directives. 15 Proposals set forth thus far for physician-assisted suicide
would all limit this option to patients with sufficient present decisional capacity to request physician-assisted suicide very shortly
before its implementation.1 6 It is questionable whether such a
restriction, if embodied in a statute, could withstand Equal Protection scrutiny, especially if a right to physician-assisted suicide
were not only recognized by the courts but held to be fundamental in kind. Perhaps more pertinent from a practical perspective
is the fact that most people want to stay alive as long as they
remain mentally intact; indeed, it is only at the point of severe
mental deterioration, including decisional incapacity, when some
persons would anticipate such a gruesome quality of life that
they might ever contemplate an assisted (or an unassisted) suicide option. As G. Kevin Donovan stated:
After all, if assisted suicide is a benefit, why should it be denied to
those who waited too late to ask, aren't yet sick enough to merit it, or
will never be competent enough.... If the guidelines are meant to
protect the most vulnerable members of society, how do we justify at
the same time depriving17 them of this benefit? The conflict is both
inherent and inevitable.
At the same time, allowing physician-assisted suicide for

patients incapable of making decisions through previously executed advance directives, with all of the ambiguities and uncertainties already attending the rise of advance directives in other
contexts, 8 would open the door to precisely the types of abuse
that proposals to limit physician-assisted suicide to presently
capable patients are intended to prevent. On the other hand,
legalizing physician-assisted suicide while restricting its availability to individuals with contemporaneous decisional capacity
creates a significant risk that individuals diagnosed with early
stage dementias would panic and request physician-assisted suicide preemptively and prematurely out of fear of waiting too
long. 19 It is likely, too, that unassisted suicides by early stage
dementia patients would become more common in this scenario
out of the patients' feeling of necessity to act decisively within an
15.

See NANCY M.P. KING, MAKING SENSE OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES (rev. ed. 1996).

16. See, e.g., TimoTHY E. QUILL, DEATH AND DIGNITY:

MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING

CHARGE 161-62 (1993).

17. G. Kevin Donovan, Letter: Physician-AssistedSuicide, 274 JAMA 1911 (1995).
18. For a discussion of these ambiguities and uncertainties, see Joan M. Teno et
al., eds., Advance Care Planning: Prioritiesfor Ethical and Empirical Research, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT S1-S36 (Special Supp. Nov.-Dec. 1994).
19. See Stephen G. Post, Alzheimer's Disease: Ethics and the Progression of
Dementia, 10 CLINICS GERIATRIC MED. 379, 385-86 (1994).
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accelerated time frame.20 The rapid scientific refinement and
public availability of genetic testing techniques that may be useful in making more definitive differential diagnoses of early
Alzheimer's disease 21 can only complicate this scenario.
A second and closely related decisional capacity problem is the
prevalence of depression among older, and especially seriously
ill, patients.2 2 As with dementia, the simple bestowal of a diagnostic label on older patients should not inevitably lead to an
assumption of the global inability of these patients to make medical choices. Nonetheless, an impressive body of evidence indicating a clear connection between severe depression in elderly
individuals (not infrequently exacerbated by excessive use of
alcohol) 23 and difficulties in complex medical decision making
processes,24 as well as a connection between treatable depression
and a desire for death in critically ill patients,25 should heighten
the discomfort about potential abuses of physician-assisted suicide with the older population.
Further, the notion that physicians are able to distinguish
ethically and with any socially acceptable degree of confidence
and precision between individuals who are capable of making
decisions and older individuals who are not is suspect. 26 Even if
psychiatric consultation is sought in difficult cases (and most situations of physician-assisted suicide requests ought to be placed
20. Kirsten Rohde et al., Suicide in Two PatientsWith Alzheimer's Disease, 43 J.
AM. GERiATmCS Soc'y 187 (1995).
21. National Institute on Aging/Alzheimer's Association Working Group, Apolipoprotein E Genotyping in Alzheimer's Disease, 347 LANCET 1091 (1996).
22. Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, U. S. Dep't of Health and Human
Services, AHCPR Pub. No. 93-0550, Depression in Primary Care, 1 DETECTION AND DIAGNOSIS 40-41 (1993).
23. See Nancy J. Osgood, Assisted Suicide and Older People-A Deadly Combination: Ethical Problems in PermittingAssisted Suicide, 10 Issuns L. & MED. 415, 427-28
(1995).
24. Linda Ganzini et al., The Effect of Depression Treatment on Elderly Patients'
Preferences for Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 151 AM. J. PsYcMATRY 1631 (1994);
Melinda A. Lee & Linda Ganzini, The Effect of Recovery From Depression on Preferences
for Life-Sustaining Therapy in OlderPatients,49 J. GERONT.: MED. Sci. M15 (1994) (noting that depressed patients exhibit less consistency in their preferences over time than
nondepressed persons); Herbert Hendin & Gerald Klerman, Physician-Assisted Suicide:
The Dangers of Legalization, 150 AM. J. PsYCHiATRY 143 (1993); Melinda A. Lee & Linda
Ganzini, Depression in the Elderly: Effect on PatientAttitudes Toward Life-Sustaining
Therapy, 40 J. AM. GEmATmcs Soc'Y 983 (1992). But see Erich H. Loewy, Of Depression,
Anecdote, and Prejudice: A Confession, 40 J. AM. GERIATucs Soc'Y 1068 (1992) (interpreting certain research as casting doubt on the connection between depression and
impaired decision-making ability).
25. Harvey Max Chochinov et al., Desirefor Death in the Terminally Ill, 152 AM. J.
PSYcmATRY 1185 (1995).
26. See Yeates Conwell & Eric D. Caine, RationalSuicide and the Right to Die, 325
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1100 (1991).
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in this category), as suggested by Timothy Quill and colleagues,2 7
there is no assurance either that the psychiatrist would have any
special training and expertise in evaluating the decisional capacity of older persons for physician-assisted suicide purposes,' or
that insurers would routinely pay for such consultations.
B.

Voluntariness

In health care decision making generally, and certainly in the
context of physician-assisted suicide, only voluntary patient
requests made without duress, undue influence or coercion have
any plausible claim to legal and ethical legitimacy. 29 Several factors may significantly and perhaps inherently impinge on the
voluntariness of purported requests for physician-assisted suicide made by elderly patients.
First, the United States is currently a fundamentally ageist
society in which older individuals are often made to feel that they
are of little or vastly reduced worth. 30 Despite the tremendous
(arguably even disproportionate) 3' public financial resources
devoted to the health care and income support of the elderly
mainly for political reasons, 2 the continual social message to
which the elderly are exposed is a theme that glorifies youth and
vitality while devaluing the present contributions of the aged.
The upshot of this psychological atmosphere is a potential endangerment of older individuals' freedom of choice. As Nancy Osgood
noted:
Older people, living in a suicide-permissive society characterized by
ageism, may come to see themselves as a burden on their families or
on society and feel it is incumbent on them to take their own lives ....
The right to die then becomes not a right at all but rather an obligation ... In a society that devalues old age and old people, in which
older adults are seen as 'expendable' and as an economic burden on

younger members, older people may come to feel it is their social duty
to kill themselves.A
Put somewhat differently:
27. Quill et al., supra note 12, at 1382.
28. Cf. Marshall B. Kapp, Implications of the Patient Self-DeterminationAct for
PsychiatricPractice, 45 Hosp. & Comm. PsYCHIATRY 355 (1994).
29. ALAN MEISEL, TE RIGHT To DIE 98-99 (2nd ed. 1995).
30.

See, e.g., ROBERT N. BUTLER, WHY SuRVIvE? GROWING OLD IN

AMERICA

(1968).

31. See, e.g., PHILLP LONGMAN, THE RETURN OF TmuRFt: How THE COLLAPSE OF
THE MIDDLE CLASS WELFARE STATE WILL REAWAKEN VALUES IN AMERICA 73-86 (discussing
Social Security), 93-4 (Medicare), 127-39 (veterans' benefits), 140-56 (military retirement
benefits), 157-68 (government retiree benefits) (1996).
32. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SAMUELSON, THE GOOD LIFE AND ITS DIscoNTENTs: Tim
AMERICAN DREAM IN THE AGE OF ENTITLEMENT 143 (1995).
33. Osgood, supra note 23, at 418.
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The problem.. .involves the voluntariness of the decision. If choosing
death becomes a socially accepted alternative, then patients needing
much care may begin to consider themselves selfish merely for choosing to live. The pressure on the elderly ... would be particularly
great
34
if death came to be seen as a 'solution' to ... old age.
Notably, the impact of an ageist society is evidenced already in
the disproportionately high rate of suicide attempts and completions among the elderly in the United States. 3 5 By contrast, the
suicide rate of the elderly in societies which hold and communicate more respect for the aged is a much rarer event.3 6
A second ground for suspicion about the voluntariness of an
older individual's purported request for physician-assisted suicide arises from the role of an individual's family in this decision.
While normally, families of older patients are an integral, positive force in supporting and assisting the effectuation of the
patient's autonomous decision making, this is not always the
case.3 7 The psychological, physical and financial burdens on family members of very sick and frail individuals, especially those
with chronic conditions requiring extensive, ongoing provision of
care in the home, are great and can affect the patient's exercise of
autonomy in many different ways.3 s With respect to the present
analysis, even the most sincere and well-intentioned families 39 in
such circumstances may end up, consciously or not, subtly or
more directly pressuring the older patient to relieve the family's
burden by selecting the physician-assisted suicide option. 40 The
stress on the family, regardless of its palpability and magnitude,
can never be a morally or legally acceptable justification for
unduly influencing a vulnerable older person to agree to premature active death hastening.41 Nevertheless, when combined
with an older person's own sense of guilt about imposing a burden on the family because of continuing life and thus continuing
34. JoHN F. KnE.R, LIFE ON THE LINE: ETmcs, AGING, ENDING PATIENTS' LIVES,
(1992).
35. Robert L. Frierson,Suicide Attempts by the Old and the Very Old, 151 ARCH.

AND ALLOCATING VITAL REsouRcEs 114

INTERN. MED. 141 (1991); Yeates Conwell et al., Completed Suicide at Age 50 and Over, 38
J. AM. GERiATRCS Soc'Y 640 (1990).

36. Jennifer A. Zima, Student Note, Assisted Suicide: Society's Response to a Plea
for Relief or a Simple Solution to the Cries of the Needy?, 23 RUTGERS L. REv. 387, 398
(1992).

37. Carin E. Reust and Susan Mattingly, Family Involvement in Medical Decision
Making, 28 FAM. MED. 39 (1996); Marshall B. Kapp, Health Care Decision Making by the
Elderly: I Get By With a Little Help From My Family, 31 GERONTOLOGIST 619 (1991).
38. Cf. Marshall B. Kapp, Who's the Parent Here? The Family's Impact on the
Autonomy of Older Persons, 41 EMORY L. J. 773 (1992).

39. Not all families meet this ideal. See, e.g., Osgood, supra note 24, at 431-32.
40. See Hendin & Klerman, supra note 24, at 144.
41.

James S. Goodwin, Mercy Killing: Mercy for Whom?, 265 JAMA 326 (1991).
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the individual's provision of care,4 2 any pressure brought by the
family can exert a powerful psychological force on the dependent
patient's choices and actions.43
C.

Ageism in the Health Care System
As noted above, the voluntary nature of an older person's purported request for physician-assisted suicide is threatened both
by general ageism in American society and by caregiver burden
and other forces acting on the patient's family. Voluntariness, as
well as the "informed" component of an older patient's physicianassisted suicide decision, may also be jeopardized by ageist attitudes and practices that directly pervade the present health care
delivery system.
From the earliest part of their training, physicians and other
health professionals are taught to devalue the lives of older
patients. 44 One important way in which this attitude becomes
manifested in practice is demonstrated by the overwhelming evidence that chronological age, by itself (that is, not used as a
proxy for or indicator of some other, more clinically and ethically
defensible consideration such as likely prognosis), frequently is a
large risk factor for specific older patients being offered less
aggressive medical treatment than normally would be offered to
a younger, otherwise identical patient. 5 Thus, as verified most
recently in the major national Study to Understand Prognoses
and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatment (SUPPORT), 46 old age per se is used consciously or subconsciously by
42. Concerns about being a burden on one's family are a major reason that Americans cite for considering alternatives to end their lives. Blendon et al., supra note 6, at
2660.
43. Rohde, supra note 20, at 188; Jecker, supra note 4, at 676.
44. See, e.g., Jecker, supra note 4, at 676.
45. Terri R. Fried et al., The Association Between Age of Hospitalized Patients and
the Delivery ofAdvanced CardiacLife Support, 11 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 257 (1996); Teri
A. Manolio & Curt D. Furberg, Age As a Predictorof Outcome: What Role Does It Play?,
92 AM. J. MED. 1 (1992); Charles L. Bennett et al., Patternsof CareRelated to Age of Men
With ProstateCancer, 67 CANCER 2633 (1991); Robert J. Mayer & W. Bradford Patterson,
How Is Cancer Treatment Chosen?, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 636 (1988) (criticizing this
practice and arguing for more individualization of the way physicians shape treatment
decisions among elderly patients); Terrie Wetle, Age As a Risk Factor for Inadequate
Treatment, 258 JAMA 516 (1987); Steven Neu & Carl M. Kjellstrand, Stopping LongTerm Dialysis: An Empirical Study of Withdrawal of Life-Supporting Treatment, 314
NEW ENG. J. MED. 14 (1986); Norman K Brown & Donovan J. Thompson, Nontreatment
of Fever in Extended-CareFacilities,300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1246 (1979). See also, Editorial: Do Doctors Short-Change Old People?, 342 LANCET 1 (1993) (stating that age bias
affecting medical care is not a strictly American phenomenon). See also Jeremiah A.
Barondess et al., ClinicalDecision-Making in CatastrophicSituations: The Relevance of
Age, 36 J. AM. GEmAnRcs Soc'Y 919 (1988).
46. Rosemarie B. Hakim et al., FactorsAssociated With Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders:
Patients'Preferences, Prognoses, and Physicians' Judgments, 125 ANNALS INTERN. MED.
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many physicians as the basis for: (a) slanting the information
and options provided to the patient (or surrogate decision maker,
in the case of patients incapable of making decisions), thus
diminishing the "informed" part of informed consent; and for (b)
applying gentle or more firm pressure on the patient to accept
less aggressive care than might otherwise be advised, thus jeopardizing the voluntariness of the patient's decision. This specter
of age discrimination in medical practice bodes poorly for any
reasonable expectation of just, fair administration of a legalized
physician-assisted suicide option for older patients.
The elderly as a group based solely on chronological age are
also targeted for proposed discrimination on the macro, or social
policy, level as well as at the individual bedside. As American
society continues to struggle with the challenge of health care
cost containment,47 a number of serious proposals have been put
forward which would, through various strategies, categorically
ration health care according to the age of the patient. 1 Although
vigorous ethical, legal, economic and social objections to these
proposals have been mounted, 49 the enthusiasm with which age284, 288, 291 (1996) (Do-Not-Resuscitate orders were written earlier for patients older
than seventy-five years of age, regardless of prognosis for survival).
47. For a discussion of the impediments posed by managed care and cost control to
the operation of the sorts of effective, collaborative, and committed physician/patient relationships that physician-assisted suicide proponents recognize as essential to assuring
that patient choices are voluntarily, knowingly, and capably made, see Eric D. Caine &
Yeates C. Conwell, Self-Determined Death, the Physician, and Medical Priorities: Is
There Time to Talk?, 270 JAMA 875, 876 (1993).
48. The seminal and best statement of the argument in favor of categorical, agebased health care rationing is found in DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LMIrrs (1987). See
also Daniel Callahan, Old Age and New Policy, 261 JAMA 905 (1989); NoRMAN DANIELS,
JUST HEALTH CARE (1985); NoRMAN DANIELS, AM I My PARENTS' KEEPER?: AN ESSAY ON
JUSTICE BETWEEN TiE YOUNG AND THE OLD (1988); Margaret P. Battin, Age Rationing
and the Just Distributionof Health Care: Is There a Duty to Die?, 97 ETHICS 317 (1987).
In Great Britain, physicians have made rationing decisions based on the patient's age for
years under the charade of "clinical indications." See J.E.C. Dickerson & M.J. Brown,
Influence of Age on General Practitioners'Definition and Treatment of Hypertension, 310
Barr. MED. J. 574 (1995); Tony Hope et al., Not Clinically Indicated: Patients'Interests
or Resource Allocation?, 306 BmRT. MED. J. 379 (1993).
49. Michael M. Rivlin, ProtectingElderly People: Flaws in Ageist Arguments, 310
BRr. MED. J. 1179 (1995); Too OLD FOR HEALTH CARE?: CoNTRoVERSIES IN MEDICINE,
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND ETHmcS (Robert H. Binstock & Stephen Post, eds., 1991); Nancy S.
Jecker, Age-Based Rationing and Women, 266 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 3012 (1991);
Nancy S. Jecker & Robert A. Pearlman, Ethical Constraintson Rationing Medical Care
by Age, 37 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'y 1067 (1989); Marshall B. Kapp, Rationing Health
Care: Will It Be Necessary? Can It Be Done Without Age or DisabilityDiscrimination?, 5
IssuEs L. & MED. 337 (1989); Edward L. Schneider, Options to Control the Rising Health
Care Costs of Older Americans, 261 JAMA 907 (1989); David C. Thomasma, Moving the
Aged into the House of the Dead: A Critiqueof Ageist Social Policy, 37 J. AM. GERATIcs
Soc'v 169 (1989); Larry R. Churchill, Should We Ration Health Care by Age?, 36 J. AM.
GEmIAmCs Soc'Y 614 (1988); Nancy S. Jecker, Disenfranchisingthe Elderly From LifeExtending Medical Care, 2 PUB. AFF. Q. 51 (1988).
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based rationing proposals have been received if not embraced by
key decision makers ought to shake confidence in our ability, and
indeed even our desire, to effectively implement legalized physician-assisted suicide in a non-age discriminatory fashion.
II.

ALTERNATIVES TO

PHYsIciAN-AssiSTED SUICIDE

The emotional and intellectual appeal of physician-assisted
suicide appears to derive from fears patients harbor about suffering unremitting physical pain,5° psychological indignity, loss of
control and independence, 51 and abandonment during a time of
critical illness that for most individuals is likely to occur near the
end of life. While end of life concerns may be relevant to persons
of all ages, the elderly correctly feel that they are particularly
vulnerable to the risks of poor and insensitive care in this
context.
The track record of health care professionals in humanely and
respectfully caring for patients near the end of their lives surely
leaves much to be desired.52 Trying to avoid dealing with deficiencies in current end of life care, however, by allowing and
thereby encouraging older persons and others to opt out of the
health care delivery system near what elderly persons perceive is
the end of their life, and to preempt objectionable care by
allowing physician-assisted suicide is not the answer.
Instead, a more ethically and legally viable alternative is to
confront current deficiencies directly and improve the ethical as
well as clinical quality and process of end of life medical care.53
The Ethics Committee of the American Geriatrics Society has
endorsed enhanced pain control through active palliation
50. Blendon, supra note 6, at 2660; Kathleen Foley, The Relationship of Pain and
Symptom Management to Patient Requests for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 6 J. PAIN &
SYMPTOM MGmrr. 290 (1991); Zima, supra note 36, at 399. But see Ezekiel J. Emanuel et
al., Euthanasiaand Physician-AssistedSuicide: Attitudes and Experiences of Oncology
Patients, Oncologists, and the Public, 347 LANCET 1805 (1996) (finding that oncology
patients experiencing pain are unlikely to seek physician-assisted suicide unless they are
also suffering from clinical depression).
51. See Anthony L. Back et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in
Washington State: PatientRequests and Physician Responses, 275 JAMA 919 (1996).
52. The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Carefor
Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences
for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591 (1995).
53. See Dame Cicely Saunders, In Britain, Fewer Conflicts of Conscience, 25 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 44 (1995) (stating that good hospice care practically eliminates
patients' requests for death hastening); MARGARET P. BAriN, THE LEAsT WoRsT DEATH:
EsSAYs IN BIOETHICS ON THE EN) OF LIFE (1994). The Institute of Medicine of the
National Academy of Sciences (Washington, DC) is conducting a project entitled Care at
the End of Life, which is scheduled to produce a report in early 1997.
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efforts. 54 Improved professional and public support of nonprofessional caregivers would help assure older patients that they will
not be left to die alone and impersonally, thereby reducing a primary incentive for individuals to seek physician-assisted suicide
as a preemptive measure.
Unlike actively intervening for the purpose, intention and
expectation of hastening older patients' deaths by complying
with questionably valid physician-assisted suicide requests, physicians who work at improving the quality and process of end-oflife care to make it more responsive to and respectful of the
authentic values and preferences of older patients are performing a noble and life-affirming service. To accomplish this objective, initiative is demanded at three distinct but interrelated
levels: clinical practice, institutional change and political
action. 56 Legalizing physician-assisted suicide, particularly
through judicial fiat, would probably destroy health care professionals' incentive to take these needed initiatives and expose vulnerable, fearful elders to the serious and unnecessary risk of
being prematurely deprived of the fullness of their days.

54. American Geriatrics Society Ethics Committee, Physician-AssistedSuicide and
Voluntary Active Euthanasia,43 J. AM. GERIATmCS SocN' 579 (1995).
55. Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Good Care of the
Dying Patient, 275 JAMA 474, 476 (1996).
56. Greg A. Sachs et al., Good Care of Dying Patients: The Alternative to Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia,43 J. AM. GERIATRCS Soc'y 553 (1995).

